The Jurisdiction of Courts of Equity to Administer Insolvents\u27 Estates, Considered in Relation to Historical Antecedents by Kroeger, Harry W.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 9 Issue 2 
January 1924 
The Jurisdiction of Courts of Equity to Administer Insolvents' 
Estates, Considered in Relation to Historical Antecedents 
Harry W. Kroeger 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Harry W. Kroeger, The Jurisdiction of Courts of Equity to Administer Insolvents' Estates, Considered in 
Relation to Historical Antecedents, 9 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 087 (1924). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol9/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
JUTRISDICTION OF COURTS OF EQUITY IN INSOLVENTS' ESTATES 87
THE JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF EQUITY TO
ADMINISTER INSOLVENTS' ESTATES, CON-
SIDERED IN RELATION TO HISTORICAL
ANTECEDENTS.*
The principle that the creditors of a man who has become
incapable of paying them all, should share equally in such
effects as the debtor can muster together, is a principle of
recognized moral right. The idea that some of a man's
creditors should receive payment in full, while the rest should
lose their whole debt, because the former have been able to
run the faster to a judicial tribunal, or have induced the
debtor to prefer them to his equal benefactors, is repelling
to our sense of justice, or, if you dislike the hackneyed phrase,
inconsistent with our ethical thinking. One would expect that
this type of thinking would readily address itself to a court
of conscience. Yet in both the Roman and the English Law,
the remedial development toward equality of distribution to
the creditors of an insolvent, took place through other chan-
nels of legal progress.
'Since the accomplishment of an equal distribution of an
insolvent debtor's property presupposes its reduction to a
common possession, there must be some form of administra-
tion. Such administration seems to have taken place at an
early date in Roman Law and to have been inaugurated by
the Bankruptcy legislation in England before the antecedents
of such a remedy in Chancery were at hand. Still at the
present time we find the assets of insolvent corporations being
administered in courts of equity by means of receivers. It
is the purpose of this paper, first, to enter upon a discussion
of the Roman Law and English Bankruptcy Law forms of
administration; secondly, to search for the historical setting
for administrative jurisdiction over insolvents' estates in
*By Harry W. Kroeger of the St. Louis Bar.
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equity, speculating perhaps on the likelihood of a develop-
ment along these lines in equity jurisdiction, had the Bank-
ruptey Acts not intervened; and thirdly, to examine the juris-
diction of the American equity courts over insolvent corpora-
tions, hoping to find a true basis for that jurisdiction, and to
suggest its possibilities.
I.
At Roman Law the original type of execution by the
creditor against his debtor was against the person. The
creditor might sell the debtor into slavery or kill him. While
the right to sell into slavery or to kill was abolished by the
lex Poetelia (313 B. C.), imprisonment remained the sole form
of execution known to ancient civil law.1
The prmtors, however, developed an entirely different
method of execution in favor of a judgment creditor, namely,
the venditio bonorum. This was instituted by a bill brought
by the judgment creditor that he and all other creditors who
wished to join should be substituted to the property rights
of the debtor for the purposes of selling the debtor's estate
to satisfy their debts. The recognition of such a bill by
the prmtor was not out of line with the development
of Roman Law. In the first place, when we consider
that the Roman Law distinguished between the natural
and the juristic person, regarding the latter as the abstract
center of attraction of a group of legal rights, and target of
a group of legal duties, which the English law regards as
inhering in the natural person, we are enabled to view the
new form of execution as merely a shift from one against
the natural to one against the juristic person. The attach-
ment of infamy to the debtor alike under the old form of
personal execution and under the venditio bonorum is con-
sonant with this view. In the second place, the fiction of
1. Buckland, Textbook of Roman Law, p. 637, et seq.; Sohm, Institutes of
Roman Law, Section 55, p. 286, et seq.
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heirship, that is, the fiction that after judgment unsatisfied
the creditors should be substituted in universal succession
to the juristic personality of the debtor, as if the debtor had
died, and the creditors were his heirs, made the development
easy. Buckland points out that the fiction was not fully
carried out ;2 for example the debtor did not undergo a capitis
deminuntio, or change of his juristic personality, so as to
be discharged of the debts of the former juristic personality.
But it is peculiar to the progress of the law by fiction that
the fiction should not be indulged beyond the purposes for
which it was invoked.
Gains describes the institution of venditio or emptio
bonorum as follows-
"Let us consider now the succession that devolves on us
by emptio bonorum. It is the estates of insolvent debtors,
whether living or dead, that are thus brought to sale. There
is sale of the estates of living debtors in the case of those
who fraudulently keep out of the way of their creditors and
are not defended in their absence; of those who have ceded
their effects under the Julian law; and of judgment-debtors
after expiry of the period which, partly under the law of
the Twelve Tables and partly under the prmtor's edict, is
allowed them for procuring the money ....... If it be the
estate of a living debtor that is being sold, the prmtor orders
it to be taken and held possession of, and publicly advertised,
for thirty continuous days; or if it be the estate of a deceased
debtor, for fifteen days. He then orders the creditors to
meet, and one of their number to be appointed magister, the
party, that is to say, by whom the estate is to be sold; and
the sale itself he orders to be carried through in ten days if
the estate be that of a living debtor, and in half that time
if it be that of one who is dead. He thus orders that the
estate of a living debtor shall be adjudged to the purchaser
2. Bucldand, ibid., p. 401.
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in forty days, and that of a deceased debtor in twenty
days.'' The method appears to be first applied in the case
of the State against its debtors. 4
It is interesting to note the form of bidding under this
institution: succession did not go to the person who bid the
highest price for the debtor's assets, but to him who bid the
highest dividend on the debtor's liabilities. This shows per-
haps as clearly as any one thing that the fundamental idea
in back of the institution was the substitution or succession
of the emptor to the legal personality of rights and duties
of the debtor. The purchaser from the magister was accord-
ingly protected by the heir's civil law actions under the fiction
of heirship,5 as well as by the pretorian action based upon
the formula Rutiliana6 The latter was one of that group of
possessory actions which the prmtors invented to protect
titles recognized in the ius gentium, although not in the civil
law, or titles in process of perfection by prescription.
The execution by way of venditio bonorum, it should be
noticed was invocable as well in the case of deceased debtors
as in the case of living debtors; and in instances other than
insolvency. It was first and foremost a method of execution,
an action in aid of, and to satisfy, judgment, directed against
the debtor's property in general, rather than against specific
portions of it. Because it was brought in favor of all creditors
equally who wished to join it_ it, its operation was as equitable
when applied to insolvent debtors as it was when applied to
solvent debtors. In fact, because of the rigor of the execu-
tion, it seems to have been necessary in practice only to invoke
it, where the debtor was insolvent, and unable to escape that
3. Gaius, Institutes, III, 77-79.
4. Mommsen, Staatsrecht, I, 178; D. P. R. 1. 203.
5. Gaius, Institutes, IV, 35, Muirhead, Roman Law, Section 71, 2 Ed. p.
340.
6. Gaius, Institutes, III, 80, IV, 35; Buckland, Textbook of Roman Law,
p. 401.
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rigor. It was by virtue of the very fact that the English form
#of execution, directed, as it was, against specific property,
,and in favor of the creditor first bringing action, was inadapt-
:-able to cases of insolvency, since some creditors might exhaust
• he estate to the exclusiona of others, that a Bankruptcy Act
was necessary. Without going into the merits or demerits of
the systen, it is cear that the Romans had a system that
worked both ways. The English developed a system of execu-
tion which worked admirably in the case of solvent debtors,
Jut fell short of complete justice in the case of insolvents.
They had, therelore, to develop a new system for insolvents
not entirely congruous with Comuon Law execution. This
new system was embodied in the various Bankruptcy Acts.
Before leaving the subject of Roman Law, a later modi-
fication of the law of venditio bonorum, should be noticed,
namely, the cessio boorumt. This was an institution created
by the lex Junia enacted under Augustus, whereby a debtor
might by surrendering or "ceding his goods" voluntarily
bring about the execution embodied in the venditio boxorum
upon himself. Whereas under the previously existing sys-
tern, execution might still be had against the person, as well
as against the juristic personality, a cessio bonorwm barred
the former remedy as to debts already existing at the time
of the surrender, and prevented infamy from attaching ;7 and
it absolved the juristic personality by providing for a dis-
charge from antecedent debts."
While the English Bankruptcy procedure was more than
a type of execution in aid of judgment,--it involved the actual
adjudication as well,--it seems that the inadequacy of Com-
mon Law execution, effective only in cases of solvency, was
the chief inducement for the new remedy in the case of in-
7. Justinian, Institutes 4:6:40; Code 7:71:1; C. 7:75:6; C. 2:11:11; Di-
gest 42:3:4; Sohm, Institutes, Section 55, p. 286 (III Ed.); Buckland, Textbook
of Roman Law p. 640; Humphreys on Real Property p. 109.
8. Mairhead, Roman Law, Section 20.
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solvent debtors. The preamble of the first English Bank-
ruptcy Act, the 34th Henry VIII, c. 4, (1542-43) is in the
terms following:--
"Where divers and sundry persons craftily obtaining
into their hands great substance of other men's goods, do
suddenly flee to parts unknown, or keep to their houses,
(where execution would not reach them) not minding to pay
or restore to any their creditors, their debts or duties, but
at their own wills and pleasures consume the substance ob-
tained by the credit of other men, for their own pleasure and
delicate living, against all reason, equity and good conscience,
be it therefore enacted ..... "
It was immediately perceived, too, that the only adequate
remedy possible in cases of insolvency was one that brought
about an equal distribution of the debtor's assets among his
creditors. The Statute of Henry VIII directs that the justices
shall order the assets "for the true satisfaction and payment
of the said creditors; that is to say, to every of the said
creditors, a portion, rate and rate alike, according to the
quantity of their debts."
Blackstone9 and Spence1 ° have both noted the similarities
between the Roman and English Laws of Administration in
cases of insolvency, the latter exprebsing the view that the
Roman cessio jure was the prototype of a similar institution
in Scotland, whence it came into England. Certainly the
similarity is not only in the finished product of legal evolu-
tion, but in the circumstances, causes and incidents of the
development itself. For like the venditio bonorum, the
English Bankruptcy Act of 1542 was not designed for the
alleviation of bankrupts, but for the perfecting of creditors'
remedies. The Act itself refers consistently to the bankrupt
as an "offender," and the second Bankruptcy Act, 13th Eliza-
beth Ch. VII, (1570) laments the increase. in the number of
9. Blackstone, Commentaries, L. II, Ch. 31, p. 473.
10. Spence, Equity Jurisdiction, Vol. I, p. 200.
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insolvents "nothwithstanding" the Statute of 34th Henry
VIII, and purports to be a "better provision for the repres-
sion of them." Like the Roman Institution, the administra-
tion of a bankrupt's estate in England was concurrent with
a personal execution against the debtor. Personal execution
continued in England down to 1839 when the 1-2 Vict. Ch.
110 abolished it and substituted an equitable execution system
in its place. Apparently the alleviating measures in English
Bankruptcy Law were not given the bankrupt as a reward
f or his voluntary surrender of his estate, for voluntary bank-
ruptcy was not admitted until the Statute 12 and 13 Vict.
Ch. 106, whereas discharge had already been introduced by
Statutes 5 Anne. Ch. 22, and 5 George I, Ch. 24.
The Bankruptcy Acts were until 1862 by the Statute
24th and 25th Vict. c 134 narrowly confined to traders. Black-
stone thought" that such a limitation was justified inasmuch
as the perils surrounding trade made it much less reprehen-
sible for a trader to become bankrupt, and much more just
that he should have the benefits of the Acts. But when we
consider that the legislation was originally quasi-criminal
and not humanitarian, and there were no benefits for the
bankrupt, we must consider Blackstone's view as represent-
ing the view of the men who were sustaining the limitation
and not that of those who created it. Probably the true
reason for the limitation is that the perfection of creditors'
rights against traders was essential to the development of
commerce, and English law in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Centuries was answering the needs of England's expanding
commerce. However that may be, as previously stated, the
bankruptcy system was made general in 1862.
With the enactment of the English Companies Acts of
1844, 1856, 1862, and 1908, providing for the winding up of
companies, the statutory administration of the estates of in-
solvents is made complete in the English Law.
11. Blackstone, Commentaries, L. II, Ch. 31, p. 475.
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It has been stggested in the early sentences of thir paper
that the principle of distribution of assets of an insolvent.
among his creditors in proportion to the respective amounts
of their debts is one which would readily appeaT to a Court
of Conscience such as the courts of equity of England and of
this country. To say that a conception has moral appeal is
one thing, however, and to say that it has embodied itself as
a ground of equitable' jurisdiction is another. Moral ideas.
do not fairly burst into the law as pronouncements of the
courts of equity, but owe their appearance to the extensions
of well defined antecedents.
We have noticed that distribution of decedents' and in-
solvents' estates was institutionalized in the Roman Law and
that of insolvents' estates also in the English Statute Law.
Yet equity did not entirely lose sight of the principle of equal
distribution, for an administrative jurisdiction in the case of
decedents' estates was developed by Equity during the Seven-
teenth and Eighteenth Centuries---this perhaps one of the
most constructive achievements of the English Court of
Chancery. And in the Nineteenth Century we are confronted
with an administrative jurisdiction over the estates of insol-
vent corporations, and the increasing number of equitable
receiverships.
Up to a very recent date, the American Receiv-
ership Doctrine has not been associated with the develop-
ment of creditors' remedies, but has been regarded as spring-
ing from that great source of equitable jurisdiction called the
Law of Trusts. It had been thought to involve an exercise
of the Chancellor's plenary power to administer trust funds.
In brief, it was said that when a corporation became insolvent,
its assets became a trust fund for the benefit of the creditors
of the corporation. And clearly, if the directors of a cor-
poration were to be considered trustees for the creditors as
cestuis que trustent, then it followed naturally that such
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol9/iss2/2
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directors would become accountable in a court of equity for
the proper administration of the fund, and the court might,
for the benefit of the parties, appoint a successor trustee,
called a receiver.
The trust fund theory seems to have first made its appear-
ance in American jurisprudence, although in somewhat differ-
ent garb, in the case of Wood v. Dummer,12 decided by Justice
Story in 1824. This was a suit by the holder of certain bank
notes, against the stockholders of the bank, to recover liquida-
tion dividends received by the latter. The bank was in process
of dissolution pursuant to the termination of its charter, and
the dividend had rendered the bank insolvent. Justice Story
allowed recovery of the demand, saying:
"To me this point appears so plain upon principles of
law, as well as common sense, that I cannot be brought into
any doubt, that the charters of our banks make the capital
stock a trust fund for the payment of all the debts of the
corporation. The bill-holders and other creditors have the
first claims upon it; and the stockholders have no rights,
until all the other creditors are satisfied. They have the full
benefit of all the profits made by the establishment, and
cannot take any portion of the fund, until all the other claims
on it are extinguished. Their rights are not to the capital
stock, but to the residuum after all demands on it are
paid. * * *
"If I am right in this position, the principal difficulty
in the cause is overcome. If the capital stock is a trust fund,
then it may be followed by the creditors into the hands of
any persons, having notice of the trust attaching to it."
Subsequently, the doctrine was applied to justify credi-
tors' suits to recover in respect to unpaid stock subscrip-
tions,'3 and in respect to dividends paid in impairment of
12. 3 Mason 308.
13. Sawyer v. Hoag, 17 Wall. 610. Handley v. Stutz, 137 U. S. 366.
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capital stock,14 and to procure the appointment of a receiver
of the assets of an insolvent corporation.'5
While there seems to be considerable point in saying that
unpaid stock subscriptions constitute a trust fund for the
benefit of creditors, inasmuch as the full par value, or in
some of the States, the full subscription price, measures the
stockholders' liability to creditors,-yet the trust fund theory
has not been favorably received, as applied to corporate assets
generally.16 It is, at first glance, a highly artificial theory.
It leads one immediately to inquire by what magic word, or
by what swing of a magic wand, title to property passes from
the corporation to the directors, as trustees for the creditors,
upon the occurrence of the corporation's inability to pay its
maturing obligations, or upon the shrinkage of the value of
its assets below the amount of its liabilities. Can a corpora-
tion insolvent be said to have less a title to its property than
a corporation solvent? Furthermore, the theory is pregnant
with consequences which its creators hardly intended it to
have, and to the accomplishment of which, the courts have
never applied it. Thus, it will be readily observed that if
the doctrine of tracing the trust funds were rigidly applied
to the case of an insolvent corporation, no purchaser of prop-
erty or recipient of payment from the corporation could be
assured of his ability to retain his property or his payment.
Insolvency would mean stoppage. And the trust fund theory
would defeat its very purpose by rendering less valuable,
because non-transferable, the very assets upon which creditors
depend for their payment.
It is quite unnecessary, however, for the writer to dilate
upon the soundness of the trust fund theory, inasmuch as the
Supreme Court of the United States has, for practical pur-
14. Bartlett v. Drew, 57 N. Y. 587.
15. See appellant's brief in Hollins v. Brierfield Coal Co., 150 U. S. 371.
16. See the following notes: 8 Col. L.R. 303-05; 9 H.L.R. 481; 15 H.L.R.
409, 844; 22 H.L.R. 523, 536; 8 Can. L.T. 372.
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poses, repudiated the theory as applied to insolvent corpora-
tions, in the case of Hollins v. The Brierfield Coal Company.17
The Court in that case used the following expression in refer-
ence to the trust fund theory:
"It is rather a trust in the administration of the assets
after possession by a court of equity, than a trust attaching
to the property, as such, for the direct benefit of either credi-
tor or stockholder."
Certainly, this is tantamount to a statement that the
doctrine of trusts cannot be invoked to found the jurisdiction
in receivership cases, since the trust relationship does not
appear until after the jurisdiction has attached.
After the destruction of the trust fund theory, there is
little left to weld the receivership doctrine into consistency
with other bodies of the law. The jurisdiction in receivership
cases would seem, on the face of it, to have been a branch of
the trust doctrine which had become detached from the main
stem. It is the chief purpose of this paper to attempt to
bring the receivership doctrine into coherence with other equit-
able jurisdiction on a historical basis, if not a contemporary
basis.
Any theory concernng the jurisdiction of a court of equity
to administer insolvent estates, would have to comply with
three requisites: First, it would have to explain just why
equity assumed jurisdiction to administer insolvent estates
at all; secondly, it would have to explain why such equitable
jurisdiction was confined to corporations; and thirdly, it would
have to present legal consistency. The trust fund theory
admirably fulfilled the first two purposes, but its legal incon-
gruity probably caused the Supreme Court to repudiate it.
17. 150 U. S. 371.
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Curiously enough, in dealing with the problem of admin-
istration over insolvent estates in equity, more attention has
been paid to the nature of the remedy, the receivership, than
to the right which it was designed to perfect. Receivers have
been employed by courts of equity as custodians of property
in the hands of the court, for the benefit of a great variety
of interests. The type of receivership now spoken of has
as its purpose the protection of the interest of creditors in the
debtor's property. It would, therefore, be far from pre-
posterous to view the administration of insolvent estates as
an amplification of equitable creditors' remedies. To thus
view the phenomenon, it will be necessary to bring into the
discussion the original forms of creditors' remedies in equity,
the creditors' bills, and it may prove desirable to draw very
largely upon the analogy of administration over decedents'
estates.
Creditors' bills have been classified as follows: (1), Bills
against an executor; (2), Bills to reach equitable assets; (3),
Bills to set aside fraudulent conveyances. All three of these
classes arose out of the inadequacy of the legal system of
judgment and execution to operate under extraordinary cir-
cumstances: the first, when the debtor's assets were in the
hands of an executor who was not compellable, or at least
defectively compellable, to account for them to creditors; the
second, when the debtor's property was equitable, or held
by such rights as equity alone would recognize; the third,
when the debtor's property was in the hands of a vendee or
volunteer protected by a good legal title.
Although equity had assumed jurisdiction over the debtor
creditor relationship, it does not follow that the equitable
remedies had either in the case of deceased or living debtors
reached the completeness of which quity was capable. Pro-
fessor Langdell has shown in his classic essays on Creditors'
Bills that the conflicting claims of the creditors of a de-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol9/iss2/2
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ceased debtor, the necessity of taking into account the rights
of priority creditors in the determination of the rights
of simple creditors, and the effort to consolidate the many
suits into one suit induced equity to assume the jurisdiction
of administering the estate of the deceased debtor; and that
subsequently the courts assumed this jurisdiction in favor not
only of creditors, but of legatees, and residuary legatees.
This system secured equality to all claimants of equal rank,
whether the deceased debtor died solvent or insolvent. In the
case of living debtors the legal remedies of judgment and
execution, and the equitable remedies of creditors' bills for
equitable execution, and to set aside fraudulent conveyances,
were fairly adequate where the debtor was solvent. But it
is believed by the writer that where the debtor is insolvent,
the race of creditors of which the legal and equitable systems
both admitted, involving as it did the satisfaction of some of
the creditors to the exclusion of the rest, and the dissipation
of the debtor's property through the wastefulness of many
executions to the detriment of unsatisfied creditors as well
as the debtor himself, would have formed some inducement
for equity to assume jurisdiction over insolvents' estates.
Completeness of creditors' remedies demanded equal distribu-
tion, and distribution, as remarked at the outset of this paper,
presupposes administration. As outlined above, the law on
this subject took a statutory course in England under the
Bankruptcy Acts, and equity did not take jurisdiction. But
can it be said that in a class of cases where the Bankruptcy
Act was plainly inadequate or unsuitable, and statutory law
had failed to keep pace with the needs which this class of
cases represented, the equity jurisdiction was not available!
If such is the case with corporations, would it seem extra-
ordinary that some jurisdiction in equity like that by way
of receiver would arise? It seems entirely possible that the
theory just indicated may be found to explain or perhaps to
fully justify the American doctrine of receiverships, involv-
ing as it does the jurisdiction of equity to administer the
Washington University Open Scholarship
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assets of insolvent corporations. In order to substantiate
this, it will be necessary to make a comparative study of
creditors' bills and of administrative remedies.
In the case of the jurisdiction over bills against executors
and administrators, the inadequacy of the remedy at law
arose out of the fact that law had no method of compelling
the executor or administrator to account. Since the action
which the creditor would normally bring against the exedutor
would be debt, an action requiring a jury, the action of
account, which was without jury, was unavailable. The only
way in which the contemplation of the assets and liabilities
of a decedent with a view to the determination of the question
of sufficiency of assets to satisfy the plaintiff's claim could
be got before the court in case the executor pleaded plene
administravit was through his affirmative defense.18 Without
going into the perils to the executor which this defense en-
tailed,-a matter which Professor Langdell takes up in his
article on Creditors' Bills, 1 -- and confining ourselves to the
difficulties of the creditor in meeting this defense, we come
upon an anamolous rule of evidence. It was always up to
the creditor to prove assets, while the executor showed his
prior disposition of them in satisfaction of debts of higher
order, or of debts of the same order previously recovered.
In order to prove assets, the creditor was confronted with
an insuperable difficulty. As a rule he had no personal
knowledge or means of knowledge of such assets. A bill of
discovery to be sure was available.20  But as we shall see,
when equity gave discovery, it used it for its own aggrandize-
ment, and not to patch up the remedy at law. True, the
Statute 22-23 Car. II, ch. 10 (1670), commonly known as
the Statute of Distributions, vested power in the Spiritual
Courts to require an inventory of an executor. But the Courts
18. Langdell, Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, pp. 133, et seq.
19. Id. Cit.
20. Story, Equity Jurisprudence, Section 735; Com. Dig. Chancery, 2
C. 3; 3 B. 1.
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of Common Law repeatedly issued writs of prohibition against
the Spiritual Courts, forbidding them to require sufficient and
proper inventories, that is, more than mere formal state-
ments. 2'
Spence22 describes the origin and growth of the creditor's
bill against an executor as follows --
"The jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts being, as
before mentioned, defective in the case of creditors, rendered
it necessary for then to resort to the Court of Chancery,
which court not only required the executor or administrator
to swear to his account, but supplying the defects of the
ecclesiastical law, allowed the creditor to contest it. The court
also decreed payment of the debt where there were assets and
which the Court of Chancery by its process for obtaining dis-
covery, was enabled effectually to ascertain. Suits of this
description, and proceedings upon them, are found in the
calendars from the reign of Edward VI downwards." (Citing
cases in Cal. vol. 1 p. 93 and Cary 12.)
Professor Langdell ' 3 describes the procedure leading to the
decree in a creditor's suit against an executor as follows:-
"If the executor admits assets in his answer, all that
the plaintiff has to do is to prove his debt, whereupon a
decree will be made that the executor pay the debt thus proved,
and this decree will be enforced by the usual process of con-
tempt. If the executor decline to admit assets in his answer,
the only difference at the hearing will be that instead of a
decree for immedinte payment, a decree will be made that
the executor render an account of the testator's estate before
a Master. When this has been done, and the Master has
made his report to the court, and the report stands confirmed,
21. Hinton v. Parker, 8 Mod. 168; Catchside v. Ovington, 3 Burr. 1922;
Henderson v. French, 5 M. & S. 406; Griffiths v. Anthony, 5 Ad. & El. 623.
22. Spence, Equitable Jurisdiction, Vol. 1, p. 580.
23. Langdell, Brief Survey, p. 131-2.
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the cause is brought on for a further hearing, and a decree
is made that the executor pay to the plaintiff the amount
which is found due to him, if the assets found to be in the
executor's hands are sufficient for that purpose,-if not, then
to the extent of such assets."
There are usually two questions which arise in connec-
tion with the assumption of a jurisdiction in equity. First,
why did equity assume the jurisdiction? This question is
answered when the plain inadequacy of a remedy at law is
shown. Second, what facilities did equity have for rendering
that jurisdiction effective? The first question goes to the
inducement, the second, to the capacity. In the instance of
a creditor's bill against an executor, equity was able to cure
the inadequacy of remedy at law by means of two of its most
ancient panaceas, discovery and accounting. The latter, ordi-
narily an original jurisdiction, is made to subserve equity's
present purposes by being auxiliary to the creditor's suit.
The former, the bill of discovery seems to have acted as
pivot upon which the jurisdiction to give the creditor a com-
plete remedy was turned from law into equity. This is well
brought out in the case of Parker v. Dee,24 in the Court of
Chancery in 1674. A creditor having first brought an action
at law against his debtor's executor, and having been met
with the plea of no assets, went into equity asking for dis-
covery. The court not only granted discovery, but gave
recovery on the debt. Said the court, retaining the bill,
"As to a dismission to Law, because the Plaintiff hath
a Discovery here, when this court can determine the Matter;
it shall not be a Hand Maid to other Courts, nor beget a
Suit to be ended elsewhere."
It should be remembered that this was the bill of an
individual creditor not for administration by the court and
distribution of assets equally among all the decedent's credi-
24. 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 13, pl. 5. 2 Ch. Cas. 201.
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tors,-this was a later development,-but for the recovery
simply of his own debt.
This case was decided on the very eve of Equity's further
extension of its jurisdiction over executors, which jurisdic-
tion, as we shall see, formed the basis of the administration
of decedents' estates by the court. I refer, in the present
instance, however, to the suit by a legatee, against an execu-
tor, for the recovery of his legacy. The inadequacy of the
remedy in the Spiritual Courts, which were by the Statute
of Distributions, 25 1670, given jurisdiction over the claims of
legatees, was the same inadequacy which affected the claims
of creditors. There was no way of effectively meeting the
executor's plea of plene administravit by compelling him to
render a full and proper accounting under oath. And it
must be remembered that equity ever used a jurisdictional
dragnet. Where a jurisdiction was once assumed, it was ex-
tended as far as the grounds for its assumption carried.
Thus when equity had come to the assistance of a deceased
debtor's creditor because the latter had no effective remedy
against the executor, it was characteristic of it to render
assistance to the decedent's legatee who was confronted with
the same obstacles. If we speak of justification, however, we
recur to the question of whether a dragnet method is justi-
fiable. We shall confine ourselves to recording the fact by
examining the early authorities.
A bill by a legatee was first allowed by Chancery in the
case of Pamplin v. Green,28 1682, where a demurrer to the
bill on the ground that the jurisdiction was in the Ordinary
was overruled. The case of Mathews v. Newby 27 decided the
following year is more interesting. A demurrer being inter-
posed on the same grounds as in Pamplin v. Green, the Court
in overruling it, reasoned, "that the Spiritual court in that
case had but a lame jurisdiction, and there being no negative
25. 22-23 Car. II, Ch. 10.
26. 2 Ch. Cas. 95.
27. 1 Vern. 133. See also, Howard v. Howard, 1 Vern. 134.
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words in the act of parliament (22-23 Car. II, ch. 10) the bill
for distribution was very proper." A new principle appears
in the legatee cases, that of distribution. The ground upon
which this principle rested was that a legatee was not entitled
to receive his legacy until creditors' claims were satisfied,
and had no prior right of satisfaction over legatees of equal
rank. This reasoning had no application to the claims of
creditors, the satisfaction of which had never in the English
law been conditioned upon the satisfaction of other creditors'
claims. How they were subsequently forced to yield to such
conditions is a topic for later discussion.
Both Story28 and Langdel 2 9 regarded the development
in the case of legatees as contrary to the Statute of Distribu-
tions. But the court, .seizing upon the fact that the Statute
contained no negative terms, squeezed it a little tighter so
that there was not much breath left in it. Professor Lang-
dell says.;-
"Suffice it to say that, in thus extending its jurisdiction,
equity relied much upon the strong arm of the Court of
Chancery (coupled with the weakness and unpopularity of
the ecclesiastical courts) and little upon argument."
And it might be remarked that the modern judge who
observes that the United States courts in appointing receivers
to administer the assets of insolvent corporations are doing
something whose justification appears not in the books, might
fairly gasp had he lived in 1682 at the things his orthodoxy
would not permit him to question today. He would have to
yield himself up to the inevitable before the cases of Van-
brough v. Cock,3" 1671, in which Chancery relieved against
a sentence of the Spiritual Court, and Bissel v. Axtell,81 1688,
28. Story, "Equity Jurisprudence," Section 739.
29. Langdell, Brief Survey, p. 156; Id. Cit. p. 155.
30. 29 Ch. Cas. 200.
31. 2 Vern. 47.
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in which Chancery upset an entire distribution by the Ordi-
nary, and, regarding the proceedings there as a nullity, de-
creed a new account of the whole estate.
The creditor's bill against the personal representative of
a deceased debtor was destined to form the basis for a further
extension of equitable jurisdiction, that over administration
bills. Before noticing these, however, it is our plan to trace
the growth of creditors' bills against living debtors, so that
we may have before us a sketch of an individual creditor's
remedies as developed by a court of equity antecedent to the
court's assumption of any jurisdiction of administration and
equal distribution.
The type of bill which is commonly denominated as the
equitable execution bill, but which, as we shall have occasion
to observe later, was an execution bill only in view of its final
consummation, appears later in the history of the Chancery
Court than either the creditor's bill against executors, or the
creditor's bill, to set aside fraudulent conveyances. The
original conception of it seems to have been in the legislature
rather than in the courts. For it was enacted by Parliament
in 1676,32 as part of the Statute of Frauds, that it should
be lawful for the sheriff at the suit of judgment creditors to
levy upon "all lands, tenements, rectories, tithes, rents and
hereditaments," of which a third person should be "seized
or possessed of in trust for him against whom the execution
is so sued." The effect of the Statute was to make subject
to legal execution such interests as were enforceable in favor
of the debtor only in a court of equity, and which had not
yet been amenable by that court to the claims of the
debtor's creditors. But the interests thus subjected to legal
execution were limited to "lands, tenements, rectories, tithes,
rents, and hereditaments," of which the third person held the
seizin or possession in trust for the debtor. The Statute
therefore had no effect upon chattels or chattels real held in
32. Statute 29 Cir. H c. 3, X. (1676).
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
trust for the debtor, for these were not among the interests
enumerated; nor upon reversions, and equities of redemption,
o" which the trustee did not have the seizin; nor upon implied
trusts.
The right thus given by the Statute of Frauds to the
creditors of the cestui que trust was the correlative of the
right denied by the Court of Chancery to the creditors of the
trustee against the property. In the view of the Court of
Chancery the trust attached to the res in the hands of any
but bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the
trust.33 As the legal estate was thus protected against the
claims of creditors of the trustee, it was equally just that
the equitable interest should be made available to the creditors
of the cestui que trust.34 It was therefore quite natural that
in those cases where the judgment creditor had no execution
at law against the equitable estate of his debtor under the
Statute of Frauds, that the Court of Chancery would at the
judgment creditor's suit give him the same satisfaction
against such equitable interest, as he would have been en-
titled to at law had the estate of his debtor been legal.
Accordingly we find in the latter half of the Seventeenth
Century and the first half of the Eighteenth Century a well
defined jurisdiction of Chancery to make the equitable assets
of a debtor available to satisfy his creditors. In Smithier v.
Lewis (1686), 35 and Angell v. Draper (1686),3 the plaintiff
prayed discovery of personal assets conveyed by his debtor
to a trustee, and application of the assets to the satisfaction
of the plaintiff's debt. The bill was allowed in the former
case, but dismissed in the latter because the plaintiff had
not sued out execution at law, a defense which we shall notice
a little later. In King v. Dupine (1744) the plaintiff, a judg-
ment creditor, obtained the sale of the reversionary interest
33. Saunders v. Dehew, 2 Vern. 271; Pye v. George, 1 P. W. 129.
34. Spence, Equitable Jurisdiction, Vol. I, p. 40.
35. 1 Vern. 398.
36. 1 Vern. 399.
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in shares of stock to satisfy her debt.37 In King v. Marissal
(1744),38 the plaintiff was permitted to redeem the defendant,
the mortgagee of plaintiff's judgment debtor. In Shirley v.
IVatts (1744),," the same relief was denied because the plain-
tiff had not sued out execution at law.
Executions against a debtor's interest in choses in action
present an anamolous case. Choses in action, though legal
in nature, were not assignable at law.4 0  Equity, however,
regarded an attempted assignment as a contract by the
assignor to permit the assignee to use his name for the
pLurpose of recovery, and gave specific performance of the
contract. 41 It followed normally that legal execution could
not run against an interest which the common law could not
transfer, and that it was left to equity to subject choses in
action to the claims of creditors. But what if the debtor's
interest in the chose in action were itself equitable? In Horn
?'. Horn (1749) 43 Lord Hardwicke intinated that a judgment
creditor might obtain satisfaction against the equitable in-
terest of the debtor in a chose in action, a public stock. The
intimation, however, was dictum, inasmuch as the creditor
had been disqualified by taking out execution against the
person of the debtor. The doctrine, however, was repudiated
by Lord Thurlow, who said forty such opinions as that in
Horn v. Horn would not satisfy him,-this in the case of
Dundas v. Dutens,44-and by Lord Manners in M'Carthy v.
Goold,45 and Grogram v. Cooke.40  The law was finally settled
by the decision of Lord Eldon in Bank of England v. Lunn47
37. Reg. Lib. A. 1744, fol. 91, note, 26 English Reports Reprint, p. 760.
38. 3 Atk. 192.
39. 3 Atk. 200.
40. 10 Co. 47.
41. 1 Bouvier 483.
42. Edgell v. Haywood, 3 Atk. 352.
43. Ambler 79.
44. 2 Cox 240.
45. 1 Ball & B. 390.
46. 1 B.&B. 233.
47. 15 Ves. 577.
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to the effect that equitable interests in choses in action were
not subject to equitable execution. This effects the result of
equity once more following the parallel of the law, that is,
inasmuch as a law admitted of no execution against legal
choses in action, neither would equity against equitable choses
in action. It is regrettable, however, that the Chancellors thus
repudiated their control over interests which they had them-
selves created.
The law in England seemed to have reached the limit of
its development with Horn v. Horn, so far as Courts of
Chancery were concerned. It was not until the Statute of
1 and 2 Victorie, 110,48 that equitable execution was made to
reach all the debtor's equitable assets, including his equitable
interest in choses in action. This Statute abolished execution
against the persons of debtors, and gave this rather complete
and effective form of execution as a mode of compensation.
Suffice it here to observe that the English development
of creditors' bills to reach the debtor's equitable assets, was
early recognized and adopted in America by Chancellor Kent
in Spader v. Davis49 and Bayard v. Hoffman,50 in which it
was held that fraudulently alienated property was subject
to execution in equity, whether subject to execution at law
under the Statute of 13 Elizabeth, or not. Pomeroy51 and
Bispham5 2 have collected a maze of authorities sustaining
the jurisdiction of equity over equitable execution bills.
It is to be noted that a clear distinction appears between
the creditor's bill against living debtors, and that against the
representative of a deceased debtor, in the prerequisites of
suit. Only a judgment creditor with execution unsatisfied
may bring an equitable execution bill, whereas the simple cred-
itor of a decedent has equitable rights against the executor.
48. The Statute of 1-2 Victoriae is sometimes known as the Judgment's Act.
49. 5 Johns. Ch. 280.
50. 4 Johns. Ch. 452.
51. Pomeroy, Equitable Remedies, Section 879.
52. Bispham, Principles of Equity, Section 526, n.
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The early cases of Shirley v. Watts and Angell v. Draper, in
which equitable execution was denied because judgment and
execution at law had not been had, announce the doctrine
that the plaintiff in order to obtain a right of realization in
equity must ha-e a property right in the debtor's assets.
And this is the classical explanation of the requirement.""
It seems to the writer, however, that this can at most be'an
insufficient reason. For assuming that the theory accounts
for the requirement of judgment, it does not, of itself at
least, account for the requirement of execution, which in
theory issues after the property right has attached, and con-
stitutes the first step in a realization of the debt from the
debtor's assets under that right. But waiving the sufficiency
of the explanation, let us test its soundness in the case of
the 'requirement of judgment. The judgment admittedly
creates a lien on the debtor's legal property to the extent
of the amount of the judgment. But can it create a property
right of any kind whatsoever against the equitable property
of the debtor in favor of the creditor, when the law court
itself is powerless to render a judgment affecting that prop-
erty in favor of the debtor himself I It seems to the writer
that equity is doing more than enforcing a right of realiza-
tion against the equitable property of the debtor,-it is
creating the equitable right to satisfaction from the equitable
property as well as giving the satisfaction.
The more simple and yet, as it appears to us, the more
adequate explanation of the prerequisites of judgment and
execution unsatisfied to the bringing of a creditor's bill to
obtain equitable execution is that of Bispham.54  This ex-
planation is to the effect that a man must first exhaust his
legal remedies, before he seeks equitable relief. Consistently
with this view, and inconsistently with the property right
theory, priority of invocation of equitable relief, and not
53. Glenn, Creditors' Rights, p. 6.
54. Bispham, Principles of Equity, Section 527. See also Cotton, L. J., in
In re Shephard, 31 Ch. D. 131, 135, and Story on Equity, Section 829.
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priority of attachment of judgment liens at law, determines
the order of realization of the various creditors' claims.
But the question still remains, why did equity permit
the simple creditor to sue the representative of his deceased
debtor, and extend its relief to judgment creditors only in
the case of living debtors. The answer appears to be that the
inadequacy of remedy at law in the former case went to the
very establishment of the claim itself, while in the latter case
it went only to the right of satisfaction out of the equitable
assets. In the former case, the difficulty was absolute, while
in the latter case it was contingent upon there being no
assets at law. The absence of assets at law was a condition
of equity giving its relief, and this must be affirmatively
shown by an exhibit of judgment and execution unsatisfied.
The requirement of judgment and execution prior to the
bringing of an equitable execution suit was not technically
imposing a multiplicity of suits, since the existence of any
relief whatsoever in equity was contingent until the legal
action was consummated. But it is clear that, if the equity
court were endowed with the functions of the law court to
render judgment on the claim, in addition to its own func-
tions to subject the debtor's equitable property to execution
under the judgment, the procedure would be very much
simpler. However, as this involves the substantive, and not
the adjective, distinction between law and equity, the dual
actions are still necessary under the Judicature Act in Eng-
land, and the American Codes of Procedure. The English
courts have gone so far, however, as to say that under the
Judicature Act of 1873,15 which provides for the concurrent
administration of law and equity, the appointment of a re-
ceiver in respect of equitable interests in land or personality
is equivalent to execution under a writ of elegit"0 or fieri
facies57 against legal interests respectively in land or per-
55. Statute, 36 & 37 Victoriae, Ch. 66, Section 25 (8).
56. Ex Parte Evans, 13 Ch. Div. 260. Re Pope, 17 Q. B. D. 749.
57. Coney v. Bennett, 29 Ch., D. 993.
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sonality. There the suing of execution is considered a "use-
less and absurd form."
This brings us, almost before our desire, to the dis-
cussion of the receivership institution. To those of us who
stand at the end of the first quarter of the Twentieth Century
the word "receivership" calls forth impressions of huge
corporations in embarrassed circumstances being adminis-
tered in court. But it must be remembered that this receiver-
ship has never been exercised in England,-at least on the
same foundation as in America,--and that its appearance is
of comparatively recent origin. For the time being the writer
desires to keep this modern type out of view, and to examine
the earlier type of receivership leading up to, and embracing,
the receivership employed in the enforcement of the decree
of equitable execution.
The antiquity of the receivership institution in the history
of the English Court of Chancery has been a matter of com-
ment,58 it having been accredited to the reign of Edward VI.59
Spence says that receivers of rents and profits were very
common in the reign of Elizabeth, 0 and cites two early cases
to the effect. In Jordan v. Armes (1588)61 a receiver of real
and personal estate was appointed pending a trial at law
determining the title to it. In an Anonymous Case (1590)62
a receiver of a moiety of the profits of a theater was appointed
pending adjudication of the plaintiff's right.
A leading English authority63 has described a receiver
as follows:
"A receiver in an action is an impartial person appointed
by the court to collect and receive, pending the proceedings,
the rents, issues and profits of land, or the produce of personal
58. 23 Ruling Case Law 32; Blum v. Girard National Bank, 248 Pa. St. 148.
59. 23 Ruling Case Law 32.
60. Spence, Equitable Jurisdiction, Vol. I, p. 673.
61. Reg. Lib. 5 P. & M. fol. 48.
62. Anonymous, Reg. Lib. A 1590, fol. 109.
63. Kerr, Receivers, VI Ed. p. 3.
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estate or other things in question, which it does not seem
reasonable to the court that either party should collect or
receive, or where the party is incompetent to do so, as in the
case of an infant. A receiver can only be properly granted
for the purpose of getting in and holding or securing funds
or other property, which the court at the trial, or in the
course of the action, will have the means of distributing
amongst, or making over to, the person or persons entitled
thereto."
Cases in which "it does not seem reasonable to the court
that either party should collect or receive" the issues of the
property embrace those between vendor and purchaser, cov-
enantor and covenantee, life-tenant and remainder-man,
tenants in common, partner, mortgagor and mortgagee, and
debtor and creditor. Cases "where the party is incompetent"
to collect or receive, embrace those where the party is an
infant or a lunatic. This grouping is by no means exhaustive,
but is intended merely to sketch the setting of the debtor-
creditor receivership cases; the reader being referred to the
treatment given the subject by Kerr for an exhaustive analysis
of it.64
While confining ourselves to the receiverships in equitable
execution suits, viz., receivers in the case of the simple debtor-
creditor relationship, it is nevertheless necessary to bring with-
in the compass of our discussion the receiverships granted at
the instance of the mortgagee. Our doing this will have a
dual purpose, first, of clearly distinguishing the ground on
which the two types respectively rest; secondly, and more
remotely, of laying a foundation for certain remarks we shall
have to make concerning the development of the modern type
of corporate receivership.
There was a well defined doctrine that a junior or equit-
able mortgagee of property, might, in event that the prior
mortgagee were not in possession have a receiver appointed,
64. Kerr, Receivers, VI Ed. pp. 15-122.
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without prejudice to the rights of the first mortgagee to take
possession. 5 This doctrine is without application to a prior
mortgagee or sole mortgagee, because he had adequate relief
at law by entry upon condition broken.66 Plainly, relief is
here granted by virtue of the fact that the plaintiff has a
property right. But this ground will not support the appoint-
ment of a receiver at the instance of a judgment creditor over
the debtor's equitable assets, because the creditor has no
property right over those assets. While our discussion of
the requirement of judgment and execution to the bringing
of an equitable execution bill involved a rejection of the
property right theory in deference to something else, an
analysis of the subject of receivers in such suits demands
this rejection, in order to enable us to distinguish between
two types of receivership. It seems to be the undisputed
fact that before modern statutory developments the lien of
a judgment at law did not extend to equitable assets. A
receiver was, therefore, appointed in an equitable execution
suit not on the ground on which he was appointed in the
mortgagee's suit, namely that the plaintiff had a property
right which it was necessary to protect; but on the ground
that the property out of which the court was called upon to
give the plaintiff satisfaction, ought to be protected pending
the decree.
But before going further in our analysis of what the
court is doing, let us trace the development of the doctrine
of receiverships in equitable execution bills. That the uni-
versal method for enforcing decrees in favor of judgment
creditors was by way of a receiver,-is by no means true.
1
65. Tansfield v. Irvine, 2 Russ. 151-2; Dalmer v. Dashwood, 2 Cox 383;
Davis v. Duke of Marlborough, 2 Sw. 137; Berney v. Sewell, 1 J. & W. 648;
c f. Spence, Equitable Jurisdiction, Vol. II, p. -, Kerr, Receivers, VI Ed. p. 41.
66. Berney v. Sewell, 1 J. & W. 648; Sturch v. Joung, 5 Beav. 557; Cremen
v. Hawkes, 2 J. & L. 680.
67. Scott v. Schooley, 8 East 467; Metcalf v. Schooley, 5 Bos. & Pul.;
Especially, Lyster v. Dolland, 1 Ves. Jr. 431; 12 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law
107, and cases there cited. Cummings v. Duncan, 22 N. D. 534.
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That it was, however, a frequent practice of the court to
appoint a receiver in equitable execution suits seems to be
sustained upon an examination of the authorities. The
ground usually given for such procedure is that the equitable
property is subject to a prior legal title and that the adjust-
ment of rights arising from thii circumstance requires the
intermediation of the indifferent personality of the receiver.
Thus in Curling v. Marquis Townshend,68 Lord Eldon said,
"It has long been settled, that, if a judgment creditor takes
execution, and finds the estate protected by circumstances
respecting a prior title, he may apply for a receiver."
The case of Curling v. Marquis Townshend, usually con-
sidered a leading case on this subject, presents an interesting
state of facts. Plaintiff was a creditor of defendant in the
amount of £2000 to secure which defendant gave his bond
for £1000, and a post-obit security, charging his expectancy
from his father's estate to secure the other £1000. Upon
default of payment of the debt thus secured, plaintiff obtained
judgment at law, and, since the expectancy had not been
realized and execution was returned unsatisfied, plaintiff ap-
plied in equity for a charge upon the estate in expectancy
to arise out of the post-obit security, and also satisfaction
out of the expectancy of the £1000 which was not secured by
any charge upon property, and for a receiver of the estates
when they should come into existence. The bill was allowed
in toto by Lord Eldon on the grounds above given. There
is further interest in the case by virtue of the fact that the
defendant's father died during the pendency of the bill. Al-
though execution at law might now have been obtainable
against the estate, the Chancellor retained the bill. Once
more we see equity refusing to relinquish a jurisdiction which
had validly attached, even though the peculiar reason for its
existence was gone. Another interesting case is that of
68. 19 Ves. Jr. 628.
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Blanchard v. Cawthorne,6 9 in which a receiver was granted,
at the suit of a judgment creditor, of the benefits of the office
of master forester, which the debtor held under a royal patent.
Here there was a clear inability of legal execution to reach
these benefits.
The commentators on receivers are unanimous in the
statement that it was the frequent practice in classical English
Chancery to grant receivers at the suit of judgment credi-
tors.70
The American Cases on the subject, too, are unequivocal.
In New York the Court of Errors in Hadden v. Spader,
(1822 ) 7 ' definitely settled the power of Courts of Chancery
to assist a judgment and execution creditor in reaching equit-
able assets. It was a mere piece of codification to embody
this remedy in the Revised Statutes of 1829.72 The normal
development of the remedy in equity was not however thereby
impeded. Said an early New York Authority 73 on receivers
referring to the provisions of R. S. 1829-
"It will be apparent that such an officer as a receiver
must generally be required under the above sLatute; and the
appointment has been of daily occurrence. It has been de-
clared to be a matter of course where the equity of the com-
plaint is not denied upon the hearing of the application."
In Osborn v. Heyer (1831) 74 of two judgment creditors,
each filing suit to reach equitable assets, the one had applied
for an injunction against the debtor's disposition of the as-
sets, the other for a receiver. It was held that the injunction
in the earlier suit should be dissolved in order to permit the
69. 4 Sim. 566.
70. Bennett, Receivers, London 1849, p. 59; High, Receivers, Section 399;
Kerr, Receivers, V1. Ed. p. 53; Woodroffe, The Law Relating to Receivers.
Calcutta 1919, p. 139; 4 Eng. & Am. Encyc., Law 576; Story on Equity, Sec-
tion 829.
71. 20 Johns. 554.
72. R. S. of N. Y., First Revision, 1829, Vol. 2, p. 174, Sec. 39.
73. Edwards on Receivers, New York, 1857, p. 398.
74. 2 Paige Ch. 342.
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receiver in the second suit to take over the assets. It is not
clear whether the creditor in the first suit was to receive a
prior satisfaction out of the assets coming into the receiver's
hands or not, but the duty of the judgment creditor seeking
equitable relief to make immediate application for a receiver
is expressly affirmed. In Bloodgood v. Clark (1834),7r the
leading case in New York, Chancellor Walworth said:-
"In these cases of creditors' bills where the return of
the execution unsatisfied presupposes that the property of
the defendant, if any he has, will be misapplied, and entitles
the complainant to an injunction in the first instance, it seems
to be almost a matter of course to appoint a receiver to
collect and preserve the property pending the litigation."
In Cagger v. Howard (1846)70 the court gives definition
to one of its court rules to the effect that the same receiver
would be appointed in separate suits brought by separate
judgment creditors against the same debtor. Here is some-
thing approaching administration and distribution of a fund.
Other early New York cases are cited in a note.77 In Illinois
courts, under a statute granting and regulating the bringing
of equitable execution suits similar to the New York statute,
the New York rule as to receivers is expressly followed. 78
Two interesting situations, in which creditors' bills oper-
ate effectively are presented in the New Jersey case of Kuhl
v. Martin79 and the Virginia case of Smith v. Butcher.80 In
the former case, a receiver was appointed of property which
was being subjected to execution at law, on the theory that
its sale upon execution would mean its sacrifice, whereas
the sale under the direction of the equity court would prob-
75. 4 Paige Ch. 574.
76. 1 Barb. Ch. 368.
77. Sylvester v. Reed (1839), 3 Edw. Ch. 296; Congdon v. Lee (1839), 3
Edw. Ch. 304; Sanford v. Sinclair (1840), 8 Paige Ch. 372; Lent v. McQueen
(1857) 15 How. Pr. 131; Heroy v. Gibson (1862) 10 Bosw. 591.
78. Gage v. Smith, 79 Ill. 219.
79. 26 N. J. Eq. 60.
80. 28 Gratt. 144.
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ably bring in sufficient money to satisfy the judgment lien
at law with a surplussage to be applied to the plaintiff's
claim. In the Virginia case a receiver was appointed at the
instance of a judgment creditor over property subject to
various liens, in order that their priorities be fixed, and the
residue be made available for satisfaction of plaintiff's claim.
A Tennessee Statute8' vested its courts with power to appoint
receivers "whenever necessary to the ends of substantial
justice," not however without adding, "in a like manner as
receivers are appointed by Courts of Chancery." Under such
a statute the right of judgment creditors with executions
unsatisfied has been affirmed.
82
We turn once again to the final developments in England
of the law of receivers in equitable execution suits. By the
Judicature Act of 18738- provision for the appointment of
receivers was made in the terms following:-
"A Mandamus or an injunction may be granted or a
receiver appointed by an interlocutory Order of the Court
in all cases in which it shall appear to the Court to be just
or convenient that such order should be made."
Suffice it to say that under this Statute, all embracing
in its character, receivers have been frequently employed in
creditors suits. Numerous cases arising under this act are
collected herein.8 4.
NOTE.-*Because of the length of this article it has been necessary to
publish it in installments. The balance of the article will appear in No. 3,
April, 1924.-Ed.
81. Statutes of Tennessee, 1871, Vol. 2, Section 3768.
82. Johnson v. Tucker, 2 Tenn. Ch. 398.
83. Statutes at Large, 36 & 37 Victoriae, Ch. 66, See. 25 (8).
84. Ex Parte Evans, 13 Ch. D. 260; Re Pope, 17 Ch. D. 749; Re Witeley,
56 L. T. 846; Arden v. Arden, 29 Ch. D. 702; In re Shephard, 43 Ch. D. 137;
Codogan v. Lyric Theater, 1894, 3 Ch. 338; Morgan v. Hart, 1914, 2 K. B. 183;
See also the Irish Practice, 43 Ir. L. T. 233 and cases cited, 43 Ir. L. T. 239 and
cases cited, 47 Ir. L. T. 197 and cases cited, 48 Ir. L. T. 159 and cases cited.
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